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Abstract
This paper reports on an experimental study of
the relationship between job capacity, job con-
centration, and market power in the context of
an agent-based computational model of a labor
market. Job capacity is measured by the ratio
of potential job openings to potential work of-
fers, and job concentration is measured by the
ratio of work suppliers to employers. For each
experimental treatment, work suppliers and em-
ployers repeatedly seek preferred worksite part-
ners based on continually updated expected util-
ity, engage in worksite interactions modelled as
prisoner's dilemma games, and evolve their work-
site behaviors over time. The main ¯nding is that
job capacity consistently trumps job concentra-
tion when it comes to predicting the relative abil-
ity of work suppliers and employers to exercise
market power.
1 Introduction
Market power refers to the ability of buyers and sell-
ers to exert a perceptible control over market outcomes
that enables them to attain higher individual welfare lev-
els than they would achieve under competitive market
conditions. Economists have used analytical modelling
(Tirole, 1988), empirical studies (Bresnahan, 1989), and
human-subject laboratory experiments (Holt, 1995) in
an attempt to understand the relationship between mar-
ket structure, market behavior, and market power in
markets with multiple agents engaged in repeated strate-
gic interactions. In view of the complex nature of this
relationship, however, de¯nitive conclusions have been
di±cult to obtain.
This paper investigates the evolution of market power
in the context of a computational labor market frame-
work with strategically interacting agents.1 Multiple
work suppliers and employers repeatedly participate in
costly searches for worksite partners on the basis of con-
tinually updated expected utility, engage in worksite in-
teractions modelled as prisoner's dilemma games, and
evolve their worksite strategies over time on the basis
of the earnings secured by these strategies in past work-
site interactions. All work suppliers are assumed to have
the same size wq, where wq is the maximum number of
potential work o®ers that each work supplier can make.
Similarly, all employers are assumed to have the same
size eq, where eq is the maximum number of job open-
ings that each employer can provide. Moreover, there is
no entry into, or exit from, the labor market; the number
NW of work suppliers and the number NE of employers
are both held ¯xed during the course of each experimen-
tal run.
Market power for work suppliers is measured by the
degree to which their average attained welfare level de-
viates from the average welfare level that they would ob-
tain in a competitive (full employment) market outcome
under the assumption of mutually cooperative worksite
behavior. Market power for employers is similarly de-
¯ned.
Intuitively, it seems reasonable to postulate that the
extent to which market power accrues to work suppli-
ers or employers in the labor market framework de-
pends in part on job capacity , as measured by the ratio
1The present paper provides a summary overview of a more
detailed experimental study (Tesfatsion, 1999) in press. All exper-
iments reported in this study are implemented using version 105c of
the Trade Network Game (TNG) source code developed by (Tesfat-
sion, 1997) and (McFadzean and Tesfatsion, 1999), which in turn
is supported by SimBioSys, a general C++ class framework for
evolutionary simulations developed by (McFadzean, 1995). Source
code for both the TNG and SimBioSys can be downloaded as free-
ware at the current author's web site, along with extensive user
instructions.
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(NE ¢ eq)/(NW ¢ wq) of total potential job openings to
total potential work o®ers, and on job concentration as
measured by the ratio NW/NE of the total number of
work suppliers to the total number of employers. Job
capacity measures the total potential availability of job
openings relative to work o®ers, whereas job concentra-
tion measures the extent to which control over job open-
ings is concentrated among relatively few employers.
The joint implications of job capacity and job con-
centration for the exercise of market power are not easy
to predict a priori. For example, consider the overall ef-
fect on welfare and market power when the labor market
framework comprises twelve work suppliers, each able to
make one work o®er, together with six employers who
each have four job openings. The excess supply of job
openings favors monopoly power by work suppliers, but
the concentration of job openings in relatively few hands
favors monopsony power by employers.
The experimental design of this study consists of the
systematic variation, from high to low, of both job ca-
pacity and job concentration. The primary objective of
the study is to test the following four hypotheses regard-
ing the impact of job capacity and job concentration on
the ability of work suppliers and employers to exercise
market power:
H1: Relative Market Power Hypothesis for Ca-
pacity.
(a) The ability of work suppliers to exercise market
power is less than the ability of employers to exer-
cise market power in conditions of tight or balanced
job capacity; and (b) the ability of work suppliers
to exercise market power is greater than the ability
of employers to exercise market power in conditions
of excess job capacity.
H2: Relative Market Power Hypothesis for Con-
centration.
(a) The ability of work suppliers to exercise market
power is less than the ability of employers to exercise
market power in conditions of high or balanced job
concentration; and (b) the ability of work suppliers
to exercise market power is greater than the ability
of employers to exercise market power in conditions
of low job concentration.
H3: Capacity Sensitivity Hypothesis.
(a) The ability of work suppliers to exercise market
power increases as job capacity increases, all else
equal; and (b) the ability of employers to exercise
market power decreases as job capacity increases,
all else equal.
H4: Concentration Sensitivity Hypothesis.
(a) The ability of work suppliers to exercise market
power increases as job concentration decreases, all
else equal; and (b) the ability of employers to ex-
ercise market power decreases as job concentration
decreases, all else equal.
Hypotheses H3 and H4 can hold simultaneously without
contradiction. However, hypotheses H1(b) and H2(a)
yield contradictory predictions in conditions of excess
job capacity and high or balanced job concentration, and
hypotheses H1(a) and H2(b) yield contradictory predic-
tions in conditions of tight or balanced job capacity and
low job concentration.
The main ¯nding of this study at the aggregate data
level is that job capacity is the dominant factor a®ect-
ing the ability of work suppliers and employers to exer-
cise market power. Aggregate market power outcomes
strongly support the job capacity hypotheses H1 and
H3(a) and weakly support the job capacity hypothesis
H3(b), but they provide little support for either of the
job concentration hypotheses H2 or H4. Surprisingly,
controlling for job capacity, job concentration has only
small unsystematic e®ects on attained market power lev-
els. In (Tesfatsion, 1999) a more detailed examination of
the experimental data is undertaken at a disaggregated
level to determine correlations among market structure,
network formations, worksite behaviors, and welfare out-
comes. This examination reveals even stronger support
for the aggregate data ¯nding that job capacity is the
key variable determining the relative market power of
work suppliers and employers.
2 Labor Market Framework
The labor market framework comprises NW work sup-
pliers who make work o®ers and NE employers who re-
ceive work o®ers, where NW and NE can be any pos-
itive integers. Each work supplier can have work o®ers
outstanding to no more than wq employers at any given
time, and each employer can accept work o®ers from no
more than eq work suppliers at any given time, where
the work o®er quota wq and the employer acceptance
quota eq can be any positive integers.2
Work suppliers and employers are modelled as au-
tonomous interacting agents with internalized social
norms, internally stored state information, and internal
behavioral rules. Each agent, whether a work supplier
or an employer, has this same general internal structure.
However, work suppliers di®er from employers in terms
of their speci¯c market protocols, ¯xed attributes, and
initial endowments; and all agents can acquire di®erent
state information and evolve di®erent worksite behav-
ioral rules over time on the basis of their past experi-
2When wq exceeds 1, each work supplier can be interpreted as
some type of information service provider (e.g., broker or consul-
tant) that is able to supply services to at most wq employers at a
time or as some type of union organization that is able to oversee
work contracts with at most wq employers at a time.
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ences. In particular, all agents have stored addresses for
other agents together with internalized market proto-
cols for communication. These features permit agents to
communicate state-dependent messages to other agents
at event-triggered times, a feature not present in stan-
dard economic models. As will clari¯ed below, the work
suppliers and employers depend on this communication
ability to seek out and secure worksite partners on an
ongoing adaptive basis.
As outlined in Table 1, activities in the labor market
framework are divided into a sequence of generations.
Each work supplier and employer in the initial gener-
ation is assigned a randomly generated rule governing
his worksite behavior and initial expected utility assess-
ments regarding his potential worksite partners. The
work suppliers and employers then enter into a trade
cycle loop during which they repeatedly search for pre-
ferred worksite partners on the basis of their current ex-
pected utility assessments, engage in worksite interac-
tions modelled as prisoner's dilemma games, and update
their expected utility assessments to take into account
newly incurred job search costs and worksite payo®s. At
the end of the trade cycle loop, the work suppliers and
employers each separately evolve (structurally modify)
their worksite behavioral rules based on the past utility
outcomes secured with these rules, and a new generation
then commences.
Brief descriptions of the implementations used for the
agent activities appearing in Table 1 will now be given.
More detailed descriptions can be found in (Tesfatsion,
1999).
Matches between work suppliers and employers are
determined using a one-sided o®er auction, a modi¯ed
version of the \deferred acceptance mechanism" origi-
nally studied by (Gale and Shapley, 1962). Under the
terms of this auction, hereafter referred to as the de-
ferred choice and refusal (DCR) mechanism, each work
supplier ¯rst submits work o®ers to a maximum of wq
employers he ranks as most preferable on the basis of
expected utility and who he judges to be tolerable in the
sense that their expected utility is not negative. Each
employer then selects up to eq of the work o®ers he has
received to date that he ¯nds tolerable and most prefer-
able on the basis of expected utility, and he places these
selected work o®ers on a waiting list; all other work of-
fers are refused. Work suppliers who have work o®ers
refused then redirect these work o®ers to any tolerable
preferred employers who have not yet refused them, and
the process repeats. Once an employer stops receiving
new work o®ers, he accept all work o®ers currently on
his waiting list.
A work supplier incurs a job search cost in the form
of a negative refusal payo® R each and every time that
an employer refuses one of his work o®ers during a trade
cycle; the employer who does the refusing is not penal-
ized. A work supplier or employer who neither submits
nor accepts work o®ers during a trade cycle receives an
inactivity payo® 0 for the entire trade cycle. The refusal
and inactivity payo®s are each assumed to be measured
in utility terms.
If an employer accepts a work o®er from a work sup-
plier in any given trade cycle, the work supplier and em-
ployer are said to be matched for that trade cycle. Each
match constitutes a mutually agreed upon contract stat-
ing that the work supplier shall supply labor services
at the worksite of the employer until the beginning of
the next trade cycle. These contracts are risky in that
outcomes are not assured.
Speci¯cally, work suppliers and employers can each
shirk on the worksite, to the detriment of the other,
and can possibly improve their own welfare by doing
so. Work suppliers can reduce their disutility of work in
the short run by not working as hard as their employers
expect, and employers can enhance their pro¯t in the
short run by not providing bene¯ts their work suppliers
expect to receive. O®setting these incentives are factors
that discourage shirking. Employers can punish shirking
work suppliers by ¯ring them (i.e., by refusing all future
work o®ers), and work suppliers can punish shirking em-
ployers by quitting (i.e., by redirecting future work o®ers
elsewhere).
These various possibilities are captured by having
each matched work supplier and employer engage in a
worksite interaction modelled as a two-person prisoner's
dilemma game. The work supplier can either cooper-
ate (exert high work e®ort) or defect (shirk). Similarly,
the employer can either cooperate (provide good work-
ing conditions) or defect (provide substandard working
conditions). The range of possible worksite payo®s is
assumed to be the same for each worksite interaction
in each trade cycle: namely, a cooperator whose work-
site partner defects receives the lowest possible payo® L
(sucker payo®); a defector whose worksite partner also
defects receives the next lowest payo® D (mutual defec-
tion payo®); a cooperator whose worksite partner also
cooperates receives a higher payo® C (mutual coopera-
tion payo®); and a defector whose worksite partner coop-
erates receives the highest possible payo® H (temptation
payo®).
The worksite payo®s are assumed to be measured in
utility terms and to be normalized about the inactivity
payo® 0 so that L < D < 0 < C < H. Thus, a work
supplier or employer that ends up either as a sucker with
payo® L or in a mutual defection relation with payo® D
receives negative utility, a worse outcome than inactiv-
ity (unemployment or vacancy). The worksite payo®s
are also assumed to satisfy the usual prisoner's dilemma
regularity condition (L + H)=2 < C guaranteeing that
mutual cooperation dominates alternating cooperation
and defection on average.
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int main () f
InitiateEconomy(); // Construct initial subpopulations of
// work suppliers and employers with
// random worksite strategies.
For (G = 1,...,GMax) f // ENTER THE GENERATION CYCLE LOOP
// GENERATION CYCLE:
InitiateGen(); // Con¯gure work suppliers and employers
// with user-supplied parameter values
// (initial expected utility levels, work o®er
// quotas, employer acceptance quotas,...)
For (I = 1,...,IMax) f // Enter the Trade Cycle Loop
// Trade Cycle:
MatchTraders(); // Work suppliers and employers determine
// their worksite partners, given
// their expected utility assessments,
// and record job search and
// inactivity costs.
Trade(); // Work suppliers and employers engage
// in worksite interactions and
// record their worksite payo®s.
UpdateExp(); // Work suppliers and employers update their
// expected utility assessments, using
// newly recorded costs and worksite
// payo®s, and begin a new trade cycle.
g
// Environment Step:
AssessFitness(); // Work suppliers and employers
// assess their utility levels.
// Evolution Step:
EvolveGen(); // Work suppliers and employers separately
// evolve their worksite strategies, and
// a new generation cycle begins.
g
Return 0;
g
Table 1: Logical Flow of the Labor Market Framework.
Each agent, whether a work supplier or an employer,
uses a simple learning algorithm to update his expected
utility assessments on the basis of new payo® informa-
tion. Speci¯cally, an agent v assigns an exogenously
given initial expected utility Uo to each potential work-
site partner z with whom he has not yet interacted. Each
time an interaction with z takes place, v forms an up-
dated expected utility assessment for z by summing Uo
together with all payo®s received to date from interac-
tions with z (including both worksite payo®s and refusal
payo®s) and then dividing this sum by one plus the num-
ber of interactions with z.
The personality of each agent, as expressed in his
worksite interactions, is governed by a worksite strategy
that is maintained throughout the course of each trade
cycle loop. These worksite strategies are represented
as ¯nite-memory pure strategies for playing a prisoner's
dilemma game with an arbitrary partner an inde¯nite
number of times. At the commencement of each trade
cycle loop, agents have no information about the work-
site strategies of other agents; each agent can only learn
about these strategies by engaging other agents in re-
peated worksite interactions and observing the actions
and utility outcomes that ensue. Each agent keeps sep-
arate track of his interaction history with each potential
worksite partner, and each agent's choice of an action in
a current worksite interaction with another agent is de-
termined on the basis of his own past interactions with
this other agent plus his initial expected utility assess-
ment of the agent. This means, in particular, that an
agent may end up revealing di®erent aspects of his per-
sonality to di®erent worksite partners due to di®erences
in their interaction histories. For example, a work sup-
plier may develop a mutually cooperative relationship
with one employer while at the same time he is shirking
on the job with a second employer.
At the end of each trade cycle loop, the utility (¯t-
ness) of each work supplier and employer is measured by
normalized total net payo®, that is, by total net payo®
divided by the ¯xed number of trade cycles constituting
each trade cycle loop. For employers, total net payo® is
measured by total net worksite payo®s; for work suppli-
ers, total net payo® is measured by total net worksite
payo®s plus the (negative) sum of any incurred refusal
payo®s.
The worksite strategies of workers and employers are
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then separately evolved by means of standardly speci-
¯ed genetic algorithms involving recombination, muta-
tion, and elitism operations biased in favor of more ¯t
agents. This evolution is meant to re°ect the forma-
tion and transmission of new ideas by mimicry and ex-
perimentation, not reproduction in any biological sense.
That is, if a worksite strategy successfully results in high
¯tness for an agent of a particular type, then other agents
of the same type are led to modify their own strategies
to more closely resemble the successful strategy.
An important caution is in order here, however. The
information that work suppliers and employers are cur-
rently permitted to have access to in the evolution step
is substantial: namely, complete knowledge of the col-
lection of strategies used by agents of their own type in
the previous trade cycle loop, ranked by ¯tness. The
evolution step is thus more appropriately interpreted as
an iterative stochastic search algorithm for determining
possible strategy con¯guration attractors rather than as
a social learning mechanism per se. The resulting welfare
outcomes will be used in subsequent work as a bench-
mark against which to assess the performance of more
realistically modelled social learning mechanisms.
3 Experimental Design
The experiments reported in Section 5 are for two-sided
labor markets comprising NW work suppliers and NE
employers. Each work supplier has the same work o®er
quota, wq, and each employer has the same acceptance
quota, eq. The experimental design focuses on the in-
dependent variation of two factors: job concentration as
measured by JCON = NW/NE; and job capacity as
measured by JCAP = (NE ¢ eq)/(NW ¢wq). As shown
in Table 2, three settings are tested for each factor { low,
balanced, and high { resulting in a 3 £ 3 design matrix
comprising a total of nine tested potential economies E.
All remaining parameters are maintained at ¯xed val-
ues throughout all experiments. Table 3 lists these ¯xed
parameter values along with speci¯c NW , NE, wq, and
eq values yielding a JCON value equal to 2 and a JCAP
value equal to 1.
For each tested potential economy E, twenty sample
economies (s; E) were experimentally generated using
twenty arbitrarily selected seed values s for the pseudo-
random number generator included in the TNG source
code.3 For each run s, the \market power pro¯le" was
3These twenty seed values are as follows: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30,
45, 65, 63, 31, 11, 64, 41, 66, 13, 54, 641, 413, 425, and 212. The
¯nal fourteen values were determined by random throws of two
and three die. The TNG source code used to implement the labor
market framework uses pseudo-random number values in the ini-
tialization of worksite strategies, in the matching process to break
ties among equally preferred worksite partners, and in genetic algo-
rithm recombination and mutation operations applied to worksite
strategies in the evolution step.
then determined and recorded, as explained in the next
section.
4 Measurement of Market Power
The current study adopts the standard industrial orga-
nization approach to the measurement of market power:
namely, market power is measured by the degree to
which the actual welfare levels attained by work sup-
pliers and employers compare against an idealized com-
petitive yardstick. This competitive yardstick requires
absence of strategic behavior, symmetric treatment of
equals, and full employment.
Speci¯cally, given any potential economy E, compet-
itive market conditions are said to hold for E if the fol-
lowing four conditions are satis¯ed: (i) Work suppliers
and employers behave cooperatively in all of their work-
site interactions; (ii) each work supplier has the same
number of accepted work o®ers as any other work sup-
plier over the course of each complete trade cycle loop;
(iii) each employer has the same number of vacant job
openings as any other employer over the course of each
complete trade cycle loop; and (iv) full employment ob-
tains in each trade cycle, in the sense that the ratio of
accepted work o®ers to total potential work o®ers is as
high as possible given the particular job capacity level
speci¯ed for E. These competitive market conditions are
idealized conditions that may or may not be attained in
any actual sample economy (s; E).
As shown in (Tesfatsion, 1999), the utility pro¯le
U¤(E) = (U¤w(E); U¤e (E)) that work suppliers and em-
ployers would obtain in any trade cycle loop under com-
petitive market conditions is straightforward to calculate
for each tested potential economy E. For any actual
sample economy (s; E) corresponding to E, the mar-
ket power of work suppliers and employers in the ¯nal
generation of (s;E) is measured by the extent to which
their realized utility pro¯le U(s; E) deviates from U¤(E).
Speci¯cally, the market power of work suppliers is mea-
sured in percentage terms by
MPw(s; E) =
Uw(s; E)¡ U¤w(E)
U¤w(E)
£ 100 ; (1)
and the market power of employers is measured in per-
centage terms by
MPe(s; E) =
Ue(s; E)¡ U¤e (E)
U¤e (E)
£ 100 : (2)
The vector MP (s;E) = (MPw(s;E);MPe(s;E)) is
hereafter referred to as the market power pro¯le for
(s; E). As will be clari¯ed in Section 5, the market
power pro¯le must be interpreted with care; the compet-
itive yardstick used in its construction ignores the fact
that organizational costs typically have to be incurred to
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Tight Job Capacity Balanced Job Capacity Excess Job Capacity
JCAP=1/2 JCAP=1 JCAP=2
High Job
Concentration NW=12 NE=6 NW=12 NE=6 NW=12 NE=6
JCON=2 wq=1 eq=1 wq=1 eq=2 wq=1 eq=4
Balanced Job
Concentration NW=12 NE=12 NW=12 NE=12 NW=12 NE=12
JCON=1 wq=2 eq=1 wq=1 eq=1 wq=1 eq=2
Low Job
Concentration NW=6 NE=12 NW=6 NE=12 NW=6 NE=12
JCON=1/2 wq=4 eq=1 wq=2 eq=1 wq=1 eq=1
Table 2: Two-Factor Experimental Design
// PARAMETER VALUES HELD FIXED ACROSS EXPERIMENTS
GMax = 50 // Total number of generations.
IMax = 150 // Number of trade cycles per trade cycle loop.
RefusalPayo® = -0.5 // Payo® R received by a refused agent.
InactivityPayo® = +0.0 // Payo® received by an inactive agent.
Sucker = -1.6 // Lowest possible worksite payo®, L.
BothDefect = -0.6 // Mutual defection worksite payo®, D.
BothCoop = +1.4 // Mutual cooperation worksite payo®, C.
Temptation = +3.4 // Highest possible worksite payo®, H.
InitExpPayo® = +1.4 // Initial expected utility level, Uo.
Elite = 67 // GA elite percentage for each agent type.
MutationRate = .005 // GA mutation rate (bit toggle probability).
FsmStates = 16 // Number of internal FSM states.
FsmMemory = 1 // FSM memory (in bits) for past move recall.
// PARAMETER VALUES VARIED ACROSS EXPERIMENTS
WorkSuppliers = 12 // Number of work suppliers NW .
Employers = 6 // Number of employers NE.
WorkQuota = 1 // Work o®er quota wq.
EmployerQuota = 2 // Employer acceptance quota eq.
Table 3: Illustrative Parameter Values for a Potential Economy E
with JCON=2 and JCAP=1.
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reach and sustain any market state, whether competitive
or not.
5 Experimental Results
As detailed in Section 1, the primary objective of this
study is to test hypotheses H1 through H4 regarding
the ability of work suppliers and employers to exercise
market power under various job capacity and job con-
centration conditions. Hypotheses H1 and H3 roughly
state that work suppliers do better (and relatively bet-
ter than employers) in terms of exercising market power
as job capacity is increased, and hypotheses H2 and H4
roughly state that employers do better (and relatively
better than work suppliers) in terms of exercising mar-
ket power as job concentration is increased. Aggregate
market power ¯ndings are reported below; a detailed re-
port on market power ¯ndings at a more disaggregated
level is given in (Tesfatsion, 1999).
Recall the market power measures MPw(s; E) and
MPe(s;E) for work suppliers and employers de¯ned by
relations (1) and (2) in Section 4 for any sample economy
(s;E). By construction, these measures are positively
valued if and only if the actual utility levels Uw(s;E)
and Ue(s; E) attained by work suppliers and employers
{ which include an accounting for organizational costs
{ exceed idealized competitive utility levels U¤w(E) and
U¤e (E) for which no such accounting is taken.
More precisely, as detailed in (Tesfatsion, 1999), the
competitive utility levels ignore three types of organiza-
tional costs that can signi¯cantly a®ect the actual utility
levels attained by work suppliers and employers in any
sample economy: (i) Search and inactivity sunk costs in-
curred during the process of establishing a persistent net-
work of relationships; (ii) search and inactivity variable
costs incurred in the process of maintaining a persistent
network of relationships; and (iii) utility losses (negative
payo®s) incurred when worksite partners defect. Even if
the competitive utility levels are ultimately attained in
a steady state sense, the sunk costs associated with at-
taining this competitive state may result in actual utility
levels that are below the competitive utility levels.
Given these considerations, it is not surprising that
the experimentally determined values for the market
power measures (1) and (2), aggregated across the
twenty sample economies for each of the nine tested po-
tential economies, were found to be negatively valued
in all but two cases. These aggregate market power out-
comes, reported in Table 4, suggest that it is not possible
in general to infer the relative ability of work suppliers
and employers to exercise market power under alterna-
tive structural conditions simply by comparing the signs
of their attained market power measures. Rather, for
such a determination, attention must also be paid to
the relative magnitudes of these attained market power
measures.
The key implication of the aggregate market power
outcomes reported in Table 4 is that job capacity is
the dominant factor determining relative market power.
Speci¯cally, these outcomes provide strong support for
the job capacity hypotheses H1 and H3(a) and weak sup-
port for the job capacity hypothesis H3(b). Regarding
the latter, H3(b) fails to hold as job capacity is increased
from tight to balanced but does hold as job capacity is
further increased from balanced to excess. On the other
hand, the outcomes reported in Table 4 do not support
the job concentration hypotheses H2 and H4.
The standard deviations reported in Table 4 tend to
be large. The disaggregated ¯ndings reported in (Tes-
fatsion, 1999) show that these large standard deviations
arise from a pooling problem. The sample runs gener-
ated for each cell of the experimental design in Table 2
fail to exhibit a central tendency; rather, they cluster
around two or three distinct types of outcomes, suggest-
ing the existence of multiple basins of attraction. Gen-
erally one cluster within each cell is dominant, in the
sense that most sample runs lie within this cluster, and
the job capacity hypotheses H1 and H3 receive particu-
larly strong support when attention is restricted to these
dominant clusters. Averaging market power outcomes
across the multiple clusters for each cell weakens the in-
dicated support for hypotheses H1 and H3 and increases
measured standard deviations.
6 Concluding Remarks
The aggregate market power ¯ndings of this study indi-
cate that job capacity generally has the hypothesized H1
and H3 e®ects: all else equal, increased job capacity in-
creases the market power of work suppliers and reduces
the market power of employers both in absolute and rel-
ative terms. In contrast, these ¯ndings do not support
the job concentration hypotheses H2 and H4. To the
contrary, controlling for job capacity, the e®ects of job
concentration on the ability of work suppliers and em-
ployers to exercise market power are surprisingly small
and unsystematic.
Hypotheses H2 and H4 seem a priori intuitive on
the grounds that concentrating work o®ers in fewer
work supplier hands should provide work suppliers with
an increased opportunity to exercise monopoly power,
and concentrating job openings in fewer employer hands
should provide employers with an increased opportunity
to exercise monopsonist power. On the other hand, it
may be that too much concentration lessens the ability
of work suppliers or employers as a whole to adapt their
worksite strategies in a °exible manner in response to
the worksite strategies used by their worksite partners.
Consequently, there may be too little \genetic diversity"
in the pool of worksite strategies used by the concen-
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Tight Job Capacity Balanced Job Capacity Excess Job Capacity
JCAP=1/2 JCAP=1 JCAP=2
w e w e w e
High Job
Concentration -54.7 -23.0 -18.7 -10.3 +4.3 -44.7
JCON=2 (34.2) (45.9) (21.1) (19.1) (21.4) (31.2)
w e w e w e
Balanced Job
Concentration -55.6 -25.7 -17.6 -11.5 +17.4 -39.9
JCON=1 (32.3) (42.2) (19.8) (17.3) (20.9) (27.7)
w e w e w e
Low Job
Concentration -62.8 -30.1 -20.5 -10.4 -0.3 -28.5
JCON=1/2 (26.4) (45.1) (21.9) (16.4) (18.8) (29.1)
Table 4: Aggregate Market Power Outcomes. Means and standard deviations for the market power measures
MPw(s;E) and MPe(s;E) for work suppliers w and employers e across all runs s for each of the nine tested potential
economies E.
trated agent type for evolutionary selection pressures to
e±ciently act upon. To test this in°exibility hypothesis,
it will be necessary to introduce the absolute numbers
of work suppliers and employers as treatment factors
in addition to their concentration ratio, and to exam-
ine alternative learning algorithms calibrated more care-
fully to observations of learning behavior in real-world
labor markets and in human-subject labor market ex-
periments.
Further work is needed to test the robustness of the
¯ndings of this study to variations in the scope and range
of other parameter speci¯cations as well. As prelimi-
nary as these ¯ndings may be, however, they do caution
against the common practice in economics of confound-
ing capacity and concentration e®ects in market power
studies by letting these two factors vary together in an
uncontrolled manner.
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